In this postmortem, I find that the design, implementation, and maintenance of financial policies during the period from 1996 through 2006 were primary causes of the financial system's demise. The evidence is inconsistent with the view that the collapse of the financial system was caused only by the popping of the housing bubble ("accident") and the herding behavior of financiers rushing to create and market increasingly complex and questionable financial products ("suicide"). Rather, the evidence indicates that regulatory agencies were aware of the growing fragility of the financial system due to their policies and yet chose not to modify those policies, suggesting that "negligent homicide" contributed to the financial system's collapse.
Introduction
Influential policymakers emphasize that the financial crisis was largely precipitated by a series of unforeseeable events that conspired to produce a bubble in the housing market. In particular, Ben Bernanke (2009b) , Alan Greenspan (2010) , Henry Paulson (2009 ), Christina Romer (2009 , and Robert Rubin (2010) stress that large capital inflows to the United States lowered interest rates, fueled a boom in mortgage lending, a reduction in loan standards, and financial innovations that produced an unsustainable explosion of credit. This view characterizes the collapse of the financial system as reflecting "accidents," such as the bursting of the housing bubble, and "suicide," such the herding behavior of financiers rushing to create and market increasingly complex and toxic financial products. 1 This view, however, is arguably incomplete and could impede the development of beneficial financial reforms. While large international capital flows to the United States fueled speculative investments in real estate and while financial shenanigans helped destabilize the global financial system, a different view holds that policies caused this crisis.
According to this view, the Federal Reserve, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Congress, and other official agencies implemented policies that spurred excessive risk taking and the eventual failure of the financial system. Thus, when policymakers highlight the global savings glut and "irrational exuberance," this deflects attention from the potential policy determinants of the crisis. Greenspan (2010) , for example, depicts the financial crisis as a once in a "hundred years flood" and a "classic euphoric bubble." From this perspective, policymakers responded to a crisis that happened to them.
In this autopsy, I assess whether key financial policies during the period from 1996 through 2006 contributed to the financial system's demise. I analyze the decade before the cascade of financial institution insolvencies and bailouts and hence before policymakers shifted into an "emergency response" mode. Thus, I examine a comparatively calm period during which the regulatory authorities could assess the evolving impact of their policies and make adjustments. Specifically, I study five important policies: (1) SEC policies toward credit rating agencies, (2) Federal Reserve policies that allowed banks to reduce their capital cushions through the use of credit default swaps, (3) SEC and Federal Reserve policies concerning over-the-counter derivatives, (4) SEC policies toward the consolidated supervision of major investment banks, and (5) government policies toward two housingfinance entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. From this examination, I draw tentative conclusions about the determinants of the crisis.
The evidence indicates that senior policymakers repeatedly designed, implemented, and maintained policies that destabilized the global financial system in the decade before the crisis. The policies incentivized financial institutions to engage in activities that generated enormous short-run profits but dramatically increased long-run fragility.
Moreover, the evidence suggests that the regulatory agencies were aware of the consequences of their policies and yet chose not to modify those policies. On the whole, these policy decisions reflect neither a lack of information nor an absence of regulatory power. They represent the selection --and most importantly the maintenance --of policies that increased financial fragility. The crisis did not just happen to policymakers.
The evidence does not reject the impact of international capital flows, asset bubbles, herd behavior by financiers, or excessively greedy financiers on financial instability, which have been carefully analyzed by, for example, Acharya and Richardson (2009), Jagannathan, Kapoor, and Schaumburg (2009) , Kamin and DeMarco (2010) , Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) , and Rose and Spiegel (2009) . Rather, this paper documents that financial regulations and policies created incentives for excessive risk and the financial regulatory apparatus maintained these policies even as information became available about the growing fragility of the financial system. Since policymakers did not intend to destroy the financial system, I refer to this policy view as "negligent homicide," not as murder.
Although I do not make policy recommendations here, the analyses are relevant for those designing reforms (e.g., . Since technical glitches, regulatory gaps, and insufficient regulatory power played only a partial role in fostering the crisis, reforms that rectify these failures represent only a partial and thus incomplete step in establishing a stable financial system that promotes growth and expands economic opportunities. There was also a systemic failure of the financial regulatory system --the system associated with evaluating, reforming, and implementing financial policies: Key authorities knew that policies were distorting the allocation of capital and did not reform those policies.
It is worth highlighting three limitations with this paper. First, I draw on a wide array of insightful examinations of the crisis from newspaper articles, books, regulatory agency documents, and research papers. I do not provide new examples or data. A second, related, limitation is that I do not conduct a comprehensive examination of all policies related to the crisis. In particular, there was a massive failure of corporate governance, not just regulatory governance. The board of directors of many financial institutions did not effectively induce management to act in the best interests of shareholders and others with financial claims on the firms as shown by Bebchuk (2010a, b) . Rather, in reexamining selective pieces of evidence, I show that an enduring breakdown of the financial regulatory system was a primary factor in the financial crisis.
Third, financial regulators and policymakers do not share a uniform view of the financial crisis. Officials acknowledge that regulatory mistakes were made. While they tend to focus on an absence of regulatory power to cope with failing institutions and regulatory gaps in which shadow financial institutions operated with little oversight, there are also cases in which the major agencies acknowledge deficient supervisory and regulatory practices (e.g., Geithner, 2009 In the remainder of the paper, I discuss how the financial crisis was shaped by policies toward credit rating agencies (Section 2), credit default swaps and commercial banks (Sections 3 and 4), investment banks (Section 5), and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Section 6). Section 7 concludes.
As other examples, the Inspector
General of the Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provided detailed evidence that regulators failed to implement their own rules to rein in the excessively risky behavior of banks. Thus, my characterization of "the" view of policymakers could be criticized as an unhelpful caricature. However, my goal is to provide a simple, but relevant, summary of the public view of the most senior policymakers as a mechanism for framing and motivating my assessment of what went wrong.
2 See (1) "Fed Reviews Find Errors in Oversight of Citigroup," Sewell Chan and Eric Dash, The New York Times, 4/8/2010, (2) the Material Loss Reviews by the Office of the Inspector General of the FDIC, which are available at http://www.fdicig.gov/, (3) the reports by the Office of the Inspector General of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/, and (4) "U.S. Faults Regulators Over a Bank,", Sewell Chan, The New York Times, 4/12/2010.
The Credit Rating Agencies
"These errors make us look either incompetent at credit analysis or like we sold our soul to the devil for revenue, or a little bit of both." A Moody's managing director responding anonymously to an internal management survey, September 2007. 3
Background
Credit rating agencies were indispensable to the crisis. To appreciate their role, consider the following sequence of transactions underlying the vast misallocation of global credit. Mortgage companies routinely provided loans to borrowers with little ability to repay those debts because (1) they earned fees for each loan and (2) they could sell those loans to investment banks and other financial institutions. Investment banks and other financial institutions gobbled-up those mortgages because (1) they earned fees for packaging the mortgages into new securities and (2) they could sell those new mortgage backed securities (MBSs) to other financial institutions, including banks, insurance companies, and pension funds around the world. These other financial institutions bought the MBSs because credit rating agencies said they were safe. By fueling the demand for MBS and related securities, credit rating agencies encouraged a broad array of financial institutions to make the poor investments that ultimately toppled the global financial system. Thus, an informed postmortem of the financial system requires a dissection of why financial institutions relied unquestionably on the assessments of credit rating agencies.
How did they become so pivotal?
Until the 1970s, credit rating agencies were comparatively insignificant, moribund institutions that sold their assessments of credit risk to subscribers. Given the poor predictive performance of these agencies, the demand for their services was limited for much of the 20 th century (Partnoy, 1999) . Indeed, academic researchers found that credit rating agencies produce little additional information about the firms they rate; rather, their ratings lag stock price movements by about 18 months (Pinches and Singleton, 1978) .
The creation of NRSROs
Credit rating agencies experienced a major change in 1975. The SEC created the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) designation, which it granted to the largest credit rating agencies. The SEC then relied on the NRSRO's credit risk assessment in establishing capital requirements on SEC-regulated financial institutions. Indeed, Partnoy (1999) argues that NRSROs essentially sell licenses to issue securities; they do not primarily provide assessments of credit risk. 4 A firm issuing a security without obtaining an NRSRO rating will face a limited market for its securities. Due to regulations and legal restrictions, the degree to which financial institutions deem particular securities appealing is powerfully shaped by NRSRO ratings. As long as the financial regulatory authorities rely on --and hence endorse --NRSRO ratings, there will be an enormous demand for NRSRO services.
Conflicts of interest in credit rating agencies
There are clear conflicts of interest associated with credit rating agencies selling their ratings to the issuers of securities. Issuers have an interest in paying rating agencies more for higher ratings since those ratings influence the demand for and hence the pricing of securities. And, rating agencies can promote repeat business by providing high ratings.
Interestingly, the vice president of Moody's explained in 1957 that, "[W]e obviously cannot ask payment for rating a bond. To do so would attach a price to the process, and we could not escape the charge, which would undoubtedly come, that our ratings are for sale." 5
While recognizing the conflicts of interest, credit rating agencies convinced regulators and Congress that reputational capital reduces the pernicious incentive to sell better ratings. If a rating agency does not provide sound, objective assessments of a security, the agency will experience damage to its reputation with consequential ramifications on its long-run profits. Purchasers of securities will reduce their reliance on this agency, which will reduce demand for all securities rated by the agency. As a result, issuers will reduce their demand for the services provide by that agency, reducing the agency's future profits. From this perspective, reputational capital is vital for the long-run profitability of credit rating agencies and will therefore contain any short-run conflicts of interest associated with "selling" a superior rating on any particular security.
Reputational capital will reduce conflicts of interest, however, only under particular conditions. First, decision makers at rating agencies must have a sufficiently long-run profit horizon, so that the long-run costs to the decision maker from harming the agencies reputation outweigh the short-run benefits from selling a bloated rating. Second, the demand for securities must respond to poor rating agency performance, so that decision makers at rating agencies are punished for issuing bloated ratings on even a few securities.
These conditions do not hold; indeed, regulations weakened the degree to which a decline in the reputation of a credit rating agency reduced demand for its services. First, capital regulations induce the vast majority of the buyers of securities to use NRSRO rating in selecting assets. These regulations hold regardless of NRSRO performance, which moderates the degree to which poor ratings performance reduces the demand for NRSRO services. Such regulations mitigate the positive relation between rating agency performance and profitability. Second, the feedback from the quality of an NRSRO's ratings to its profits has been further weakened by the inability of those using credit ratings to sue
NRSROs. Rating agencies claim that their ratings are opinions, which are protected by the right of free speech. The agencies and executives claim that they bear no responsibility for the quality of those ratings.
Securitization and the intensification of conflicts of interest
Any remnants of a disciplining effect of reputational capital on the conflicts of interest plaguing NRSROs were essentially eliminated by the explosive growth of securitized and structured financial products from the late-1990s onward. Securitization and structuring involved the packaging and rating of trillions of dollars worth of new financial instruments. Huge fees associated with processing these securities flowed to banks and NRSROs. Impediments to this securitization and structuring process, such as the issuance of low credit rating on the securities, would gum-up the system, reducing rating agency profits.
In fact, the NRSROs started selling ancillary consulting services to facilitate the processing of securitized instruments, increasing NRSRO incentives to exaggerate ratings on structured products. Besides purchasing ratings from the NRSROs, the banks associated with creating structured financial products would first pay the rating agencies for guidance on how to package the securities to get high ratings and then pay the rating agencies to rate the resultant products. The short-run profits from these activities were mind bogglingly large and made the future losses from the inevitable loss of reputational capital irrelevant.
Thus, rating agencies faced little market discipline, had no significant regulatory oversight, were protected from competition by regulators, and enjoyed a burgeoning market for their services. 6
The regulatory community did not adapt to these well-known developments.
Distressingly, the intensification of conflicts of interest through the selling of consulting services by rating agencies closely resembles the amplification of conflicts of interest when accounting firms increased their sales of consulting services to the firms they were auditing. This facilitated the corporate scandals that emerged less than a decade ago, motivating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Yet, still, regulators did not respond as rating agencies pursued these increasingly profitable lines of business.
It was good to be an NRSRO.
Given the regulatory-induced protections enjoyed by NRSROs, their behavior and profitability were unsurprising. Lowenstein's (2008) excellent description of the rating of a mortgage backed security by Moody's demonstrates the speed with which complex products had to be rated, the poor assumptions on which these ratings were based, and the profits generated by rating structured products. Other information indicates that if the rating agencies issued a lower rating than Countrywide (a major purchaser of NRSRO ratings) wanted, a few phone calls would get this changed. 7
The profit margins enjoyed by NRSROs were extraordinary. 
Conclusions
While the crisis does not have a single cause, the behavior of the credit rating agencies is a defining characteristic. It is impossible to imagine the current crisis without the activities of the NRSROs. And, it is difficult to imagine the behavior of the NRSROs without the regulations that permitted, protected, and encouraged their activities.
In terms of a postmortem of the financial system, the role of NRSROs is not an example of "accidental" death or "suicide. 
The Fed, CDSs, and bank capital
The explosive growth of CDSs was abetted by the Fed's 1996 decision permitting banks to use CDSs to reduce capital reserves (Tett, 2009, p.49) . Regulators treated securities guaranteed by a seller of CDSs as having the risk level of the seller -or more accurately, the counterparty -of the CDS. For example, a bank purchasing full CDS protection from American International Group (AIG) on collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) linked to sub-prime loans would have those CDOs treated as AAA securities for capital regulatory purposes because AIG had an AAA rating from a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, i.e., from a SEC-approved credit rating agency.
Given the pricing of CDSs and the Fed's regulatory decision, banks found CDSs valuable tools for reducing capital and investing in more lucrative, albeit more risky, assets.
For example, a bank with a typical portfolio of $10 billion of commercial loans could reduce its capital reserves against these assets from about $800 million to under $200 million by purchasing CDSs for a small fee (Tett, 2009, p. 64) . By 2007, the largest U.S. commercial banks had purchased $7.9 trillion in CDS protection (Barth et al., 2009 ).
There were, however, serious problems associated with allowing banks to reduce their capital via CDSs. Given the active trading of CDSs, it was sometimes difficult to indentify the actual counterparty legally responsible for compensating a bank if an "insured" security failed. Furthermore, some bank counterparties developed massive exposures to CDS risk. For example, AIG had a notional exposure of about $500 billion to CDSs (and related derivatives) in 2007, while having a capital base of about $100 billion to cover all its traditional insurance activities as well as its financial derivatives business. The growing exposure of AIG and other issuers of CDSs should have -and did --raise concerns about their ability to satisfy their obligations in times of economic stress.
The Fed maintains its policy despite growing risks
The Fed was aware of the growing danger to the safety and soundness of the banking system from CDSs. 8 For instance, Tett (2009, p. 157-163) 8 There is a longer history. In 1992, the President of the NY Federal Reserve Bank, Jerry Corrigan, expressed grave concerns that derivatives, primarily interest rates swaps, threatened the stability of banks and threatened the banks with tighter regulations (Tett, 2009, 17-18) . But, Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the entire Federal Reserve System, supported the International Swaps and Derivatives Association and successfully convinced Congress in 1994 to keep derivatives largely unregulated (Tett, 2009, 39-40 
The key question is why the Fed maintained its capital regulations with respect to
CDSs as it learned of the growing fragility of the banking system due to the mushrooming use of increasingly suspect CDSs. Bank purchases of CDSs boomed immediately after the 1996 regulatory decision allowing a reduction in bank capital from the purchase of CDSs. hedge funds warned the Fed, the Treasury, and G8 delegates about the growing fragility of commercial banks (Tett, 2009, p. 160-3) ? The Fed's decision to maintain its regulatory stance toward CDSs was neither a failure of information, nor a shortage of regulatory power. 11
The Fed could have modified its capital regulations based on two simple, prudent premises. First, the Fed is responsible for the safety and soundness of the financial system, which relies on the largest banks holding capital commensurate with their risks. Second, the Fed did not have reliable methods for assessing the credit risk of those selling CDSs to banks, nor could it rely on the credit rating agencies to assess that counterparty risk. Based on these principles, the Fed could have prohibited banks from reducing regulatory capital via CDSs until the Fed had confidence in the financial viability of those selling CDSs to banks. It is true that the Fed did not have regulatory authority over CDSs, the credit rating agencies, AIG, or many other sellers of CDSs, so it could not have directly improved the counterparty risk associated with CDS. But, the Fed was --and is --responsible for overseeing the safety and soundness of the major banks. If it had refused to allow banks to reduce their capital reserves via CDSs, the Fed could have both enhanced the stability of the major banks and indirectly created incentives for improvements in the CDS market.
It was a choice; it was a failure of regulatory governance.
11 As argued by Barth et al (2009, p. 184) : "… even if the top officials from these regulatory agencies did not appreciate or wish to act earlier on the information they had, their subordinates apparently fully understood and appreciated the growing magnitude of the problem." Also, see the Fed's 2004 Interpretive Letter #998, which reiterates the Fed's capital regulatory policy with respect to CDSs.
Postmortem
I am not suggesting that the Fed's decision to allow banks to reduce their regulatory capital through the purchase of CDSs was the major cause of the global financial crisis. It is quite difficult to quantify the degree to which this policy increased risk-taking at any individual bank or the fragility of the financial system as a whole.
I am suggesting that the evolution of the CDS market, the fragility of the banks, and the Fed's capital rules illustrate key features of the financial crisis that are frequently ignored in current discussions of regulatory reform.
First, the problems with CDSs and bank capital were not a surprise in 2008; there was ample warning that things were going awry. This history is unsupportive of the "accident" explanation of the crisis.
Second, the evidence is more consistent with a "suicide" explanation. Banks purchased CDS to reduce capital, which allowed them to invest in riskier, more profitable endeavors. That is, banks drove themselves into an increasingly fragile state in search of additional profits.
Third, the evidence is most consistent with the "negligent homicide" view: Senior government policymakers created policies that encouraged reckless behavior by financiers and adhered to those policies over many years even as they learned about the ramifications of their policies. To maximize expected profits and bonuses, bank owners and managers have incentives to reduce capital and invest in higher expected-return assets. This is the standard risk-shifting motivation. Moreover, policies, such as deposit insurance, implicit government guarantees of debt contracts, or too-big-to-fail, magnify the incentives for rational, i.e., non-suicidal, bankers to increase risk-taking. The Fed's policies sanctioned and encouraged this behavior.
Transparency vs. The FED, SEC, and Treasury
Powerful regulators and policymakers thwarted efforts to make the CDS market In 1998, the CFTC issued a "concept release" report calling for greater transparency of OTC derivatives. The CFTC sought greater information disclosure, improvements in record keeping, and controls on fraud. The CFTC did not call for draconian controls on the derivatives market; it called for more transparency.
The response by the Fed, the Treasury, and the SEC was swift: They stopped the CFTC. First, they obtained a six month moratorium on the CFTC's ability to implement the strategies outlined in its concept release. Second, the President's Working Group on The point of this addendum is to emphasize that senior regulators and policymakers lobbied hard to keep CDSs and other derivatives in opaque markets. This policy was not an accident; it was a choice.
The point of this addendum is to emphasize that senior regulators and policymakers lobbied hard to keep CDSs and other derivatives in opaque markets. Thus, a comprehensive assessment of the causes of the crisis must evaluate why policymakers made choices like this. Indeed, Nick Timiraos and James R. Hagerty argue in The Wall Street Journal on February 9, 2010, "Nearly a year and half after the outbreak of the global economic crisis, many of the problems that contributed to it haven't been tamed. The U.S. has no system in place to tackle a failure of its largest financial institutions. Derivatives contracts of the kind that crippled American International Group Inc. still trade in the shadows. And investors remain heavily reliant on the same credit-ratings firms that gave AAA ratings to lousy mortgage securities." 
Three Coordinated SEC Policies
Consider three interrelated SEC decisions regarding the regulation of investment dealers. 13 Second, in a related, coordinated 2004 policy change, the SEC enacted a rule that induced the five investment banks to become "consolidated supervised entities" (CSEs):
The SEC would oversee the entire financial firm. Specifically, the SEC now had responsibility for supervising the holding company, broker-dealer affiliates, and all other affiliates on a consolidated basis. These other affiliates include other regulated entities, such as foreign-registered broker-dealers and banks, as well as unregulated entities such as derivatives dealers (Colby, 2007) . The SEC was charged with evaluating the models employed by the broker-dealers in computing appropriate capital levels and assessing the overall stability of the consolidated investment bank. Given the size and complexity of these financial conglomerates, overseeing the CSEs was a systemically important and difficult responsibility.
The investment banks were permitted to use their own mathematical models of asset and portfolio risk to compute appropriate capital levels. The investment banks responded by issuing more debt to purchase more risky securities without putting commensurately more of their own capital at risk. Leverage ratios soared from their 2004 levels, as the bank's models indicated that they had sufficient capital cushions.
Third, the SEC neutered its ability to conduct consolidated supervision of major investment banks. With the elimination of the net capital rule and the added complexity of consolidated supervision, the SEC's head of market regulation, Annette Nazareth, promised to hire high-skilled supervisors to assess the riskiness of investment banking activities. But, the SEC didn't. In fact, the SEC had only seven people to examine the parent companies of the investment banks, which controlled over $4 trillion in assets. Under Christopher Cox, who became chairman in 2005, the SEC eliminated the risk management office and failed to complete a single inspection of a major investment bank in the year and a half before the collapse of those banks (Labaton, 2008) . Cox also weakened the Enforcement Division's freedom to impose fines on financial firms under its jurisdiction.
The effects of these decisions
The combination of these three policies contributed to the onset, magnitude, and breadth of the financial crisis. The SEC's decisions created enormous latitude and incentives for investment banks to increase risk, and they did. The SEC has correctly argued that the net capital rule never applied to the holding company in defending the 2004 net capital rule. But, this defense is narrowly focuses on the net capital rule alone. It is the combination of SEC policies that helped trigger the crisis, not only the change in the net capital rule. 14 In easing the net capital rule, adopting a system of consolidated supervision, but failing to develop the capabilities to supervise large financial conglomerates, the SEC became willfully blind to excessive risk-taking. The evidence points inexorably toward the SEC as an accomplice in creating a fragile financial system.
14 The SEC also correctly notes that leverage ratios at the CSE holding companies were higher during some years in the 1990s than in 2006. But, the nature of financial markets and risk-taking shifted markedly from the 1990s to the mid-2000s due to the explosion of structured products and the increased use of OTC derivatives. Thus, comparing leverage ratios in the 1990s to those in 2006 is much less informative than comparing leverage ratios from 2004 to 2006, when leverage ratios boomed after the SEC changed its policies. In assessing why the major financial firms under the SEC's purview failed, it is critical to examine the combination of policy responses, not only the net capital rule change.
Indeed, the current Chairwomen of the SEC, Mary Schapiro, and a court appointed investigator agree with this assessment. Ms. Schapiro noted: "I think everybody a few years ago got caught up in the idea that the markets are self-correcting and self-disciplined, and that the people in Wall Street will do a better job protecting the financial system than the regulators would. I do think the SEC got diverted by that philosophy. … the bill as introduced would subject the CSEs that already are highly regulated under the Commission's consolidated supervision program to an additional layer of duplicative and burdensome holding company oversight. The bill should be amended to recognize the unique ability of the Commission to comprehensively supervise the consolidated groups … Because the Commission has established a successful consolidated supervision program based on its unique expertise...
Eighteen months after the SEC argued that it was successfully supervising the five major investment banks, they had either gone bankrupt, failed and merged with other firms, or were forced to convert to bank holding companies, with billions of taxpayer dollars spent on facilitating these arrangements. The purposeful elimination of supervisory guardrails supports a charge of gross negligence, without malice, in facilitating the financial crisis.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Background
The government took over the two regulated housing-finance giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, on September 7, 2008 that together owned or guaranteed almost $7 trillion worth of mortgages. 16
These government-sponsored entities (GSEs) were designed to facilitate housing finance. They purchase mortgages from banks and mortgages companies that lend directly to homeowners, package the mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), guarantee timely payment of interest and principal, and sell the MBSs to investors. Besides this core securitization activity, the GSEs also buy and hold mortgages and MBSs. By increasing the demand for, and hence the price of, mortgages in the secondary market, the GSEs can reduce the interest rates the homebuyers pay on mortgages in the primary market, fostering home ownership.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are Congressionally-chartered, stockholder-owned corporations.
While facilitating housing is a raison d'être, the GSEs also use their privileged positions to earn substantial profits. Specifically, the GSEs borrow cheaply: the debt issued by these two financial institutions enjoyed an implicit government guarantee, which was made explicit when the government placed them into conservatorship. Thus, the GSEs could borrow at low interest rates and buy mortgages with higher interest rates. Over time, the GSEs increased the degree to which they bought and held mortgages relative to their securitization role, in which they bought, packaged, guaranteed, and sold MBSs. As long as there were not too many defaults, the GSEs made enormous profits. Indeed, profits were limited primarily by the size of the mortgage market and threatened by regulatory interventions that might force GSEs to funnel more of their earnings into lowering primary mortgage rates, with a concomitant lowering of GSE profits. Fortunately for the GSEs, Congress and other policymakers helped expand the mortgage market and kept regulatory interventions to a minimum.
Policy changes and effects
Two policies combined to expand the mortgage market for GSEs: the expansion of The push into lower quality mortgages created a complex "mutual dependency"
between Congress and the GSEs, fueling their increasingly risky investments (Wallison and Calomiris, 2008) . Congress relied on the GSEs to both promote housing policies and to By signaling to mortgage lenders that they would purchase mortgages with subprime characteristics --such as mortgages with low FICO credit scores, high loan-to-value ratios, negative amortization, low documentation --Fannie and Freddie triggered a massive movement into the issuance of lower quality mortgages. Mortgage companies were more willing to accept the fees for making loans to questionable borrowers if they knew that the GSEs would purchase the loan.
Conclusion
Finance is powerful. As the last few years demonstrate, the malfunctioning of the financial system can trigger economic crises, harming the welfare of many. As the last few centuries demonstrate, the functioning of the financial system affects long-run economic growth. If financial systems funnel society's savings to those with the best projects, this helps promote and sustain economic progress (Levine, 2005) . Getting financial policies right is a first-order priority in creating an environment conducive to economic prosperity. The evidence indicates that financial sector policies during the period from 1996 through 2006 precipitated the crisis. Either by becoming willfully blind to excessive risk taking or by maintaining policies that encouraged destabilizing behaviors, policymakers and regulatory agencies contributed to the financial system's collapse. As noted by Senator
Carl Levin, "The recent financial crisis was not a natural disaster; it was a manmade economic assault. It will happen again unless we change the rules."
